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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY D. WAGNER and ROBERT W. 
WAGNER, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES, and UTAH STATE 
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Case No. 20030106-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002). 
The judgment appealed from was entered January 10, 2003 (R. 75-73), and the notice of 
appeal was filed February 3, 2003 (R. 86-85). The Notice of Appeal was within the time 
permitted by Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Does plaintiffs' complaint state a claim for negligent supervision of a ward of 
the State who is profoundly retarded to the degree of being incapable of committing an 
intentional tort, who had a history of violent conduct, and who was taken to a public place 
where he injured plaintiff Tracy Wagner by violent conduct? 
1 
2. Was it error for the trial court to rule that the affirmative defense asserted 
under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) had been established as a matter of law, even though 
there was no evidence establishing that defense, i.e., no evidence that the conduct of Mr. 
Giese was intentional? 
These are questions of law reviewed for correctness. Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 
P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995). In reviewing an order granting a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, the 
Court must assume that the factual allegations in the complaint are true and draw all 
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. Whipple v. American Fork 
Irrigation, Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1219 (Utah 1996). ff[T]he trial court's ruling should be 
affirmed only if it clearly appears the complainant can prove no set of facts in support of his 
or her claims.M Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380, 382 (Utah Ct App. 1994) citing 
Hansen v. Department of Fin. Inst., 858 P.2d 184, 185-86 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Key to the determination of the case is Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(22), which 
defines "incapacitated person" as follows: 
[A]ny person who is impaired by reason of mental illness, 
mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use of 
drugs, chronic intoxication, or other cause, except minority, to 
the extent of lacking sufficient understanding or capacity to 
make or communicate responsible decisions. 
Also key is the case of Tiede v. Utah State Dept. of Corrections, 915 P.2d 500 (Utah 
1996), which imposes and defines the intent requirement for a civil assault. 
The defense places primary reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2), which is 
quoted in full in appendix, and which provides an exception to the waiver of governmental 
immunity where an assault or other intentional tort is the basis for injury to the plaintiff. 
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Finally, the trial court below placed principal reliance on the case of Wright v. State 
of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), which is not controlling and is distinguishable 
on its facts. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a final judgment in a civil action. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Plaintiffs filed their complaint 
on July 25, 2002, alleging negligent supervision by the defendants. (R. 5-1.) The 
defendants filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the complaint failed to state a cause of 
action upon which relief can be granted. (R. 25-24.) That motion was granted and the order 
thereon entered January 10,2003. (R. 75-73.) Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on February 
3, 2003. (R. 86-85.) 
C. Statement of Facts. Plaintiff Tracy D. Wagner was doing business at the K-
Mart store located at 175 North West State Road in American Fork, Utah on October 16, 
2001, at approximately 12:30 p.m., and was standing in line with others at the customer 
service desk near the front of the store. (R. 4 f^ 8.) Unknown to Tracy D. Wagner, Sam 
Giese, a patient of the Utah State Development Center, was in the store somewhere behind 
her. (R. 4 f 8; R. 36 Tf 1.) Mr. Giese became violent, took Tracy D. Wagner by the head and 
hair, threw her to the ground, and otherwise acted in such a way as to cause serious bodily 
injury to her. (R. 4^8.) 
Mr. Giese is profoundly retarded and a ward of the State of Utah. He is an 
"incapacitated person" under any definition, including the definition found at Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-1-201(22). By reason of mental deficiency or developmental disability, Mr. 
Giese lacked sufficient understanding or capacity to be responsible, as a matter of law, for 
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breaching any standard of care relating to any negligent or intentional tort. (R. 4 ^J10.) Mr. 
Giese had a history of violent conduct and presented a danger to the public if not properly 
supervised. (R. 41f 9; R. 3 fl 12.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The complaint states a cause of action against the state for negligent supervision by 
one of its employees. The state had a duty to protect others from Mr. Giese because the 
State knew that Mr. Giese had a propensity for violence and was a dangerous individual. 
The State breached its duty to protect others from Mr. Giese when its employees took Mr. 
Giese to a K-Mart store in American Fork and then failed to properly supervise him, 
enabling him to attack and seriously injure Tracy Wagner. As a result of the State's failure 
to supervise Mr. Giese, Mrs. Wagner sustained serious injuries and incurred medical 
expenses. 
The trial court erred by ruling, without the State presenting any evidence, that the 
State had met its burden of proving its affirmative defense. The trial court ruled that the 
State's affirmative defense of sovereign immunity under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1(2) was 
an absolute bar to all of the plaintiffs' claims because Mr. Giese committed an intentional 
tort even though the complaint only alleged negligence on the part of the State. The trial 
court based its ruling on the State's argument that the statute's bar on liability is tied to the 
nature of the conduct not to the intent of the individual. This ruling was error because it did 
not require the state to prove that an intentional tort had been committed. 
The real issue in the case is not whether Mr. Giese can be liable for an intentional tort, 
but whether his act actually constitutes an intentional tort. Although a mentally disabled 
person may be held responsible for harm caused by his or her conduct, that liability stems 
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from the public policy that where two innocent people are involved the one who occasioned 
the wrong should bear the loss. Mentally incompetent people are incapable of forming the 
requisite intent to commit an intentional tort. While they may be liable for the injuries 
caused by an act characterized as an intentional tort, that does not mean they can commit an 
intentional tort. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION 
TO DISMISS THE TRIAL COURT EFFECTIVELY 
REVERSED THE BURDEN OF PROOF REGARDING 
THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF IMMUNITY AND 
ERRONEOUSLY RULED ON FACTUAL ISSUES 
REGARDING INTENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The plaintiffs' complaint is founded upon a legal theory of negligence. The duty of 
the defendants arose from their assumption of the custody and control of a profoundly 
retarded individual with a history of violent conduct, and from their actions in taking this 
individual to a public place.1 The defendants breached their duty by failing to adequately 
protect the public from the violent acts of this ward of the State. The injuries proximately 
caused by the breach of duty are set forth in the complaint. 
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The legal basis for dismissal is 
summarized by the defendants as follows: 
*See Restatement (Second) of Torts §319, "One who takes charge of a third person 
whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled 
is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from 
doing such harm." 
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Defendants (collectively the "State" or the "Defendants"), 
through their counsel Barry G. Lawrence, Assistant Attorney 
General, moves [sic] this Court, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for an order dismissing with 
prejudice all of the claims asserted against them in this matter 
on the grounds that all such claims are barred by the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act (Utah Code Ann., 63 -3 0-1, et seq., 
the "Immunity Act"), based on the four corners of plaintiffs' 
Complaint, as a matter of law. 
R. 25 (Defendants' Motion to Dismiss). 
The motion to dismiss places at issue whether there is a "failure [in the complaint] to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In reality, 
however, the defendants did not allege an insufficiency in the language of the complaint, 
they alleged that the affirmative defense of immunity barred the claim, assuming as true all 
allegations of the complaint and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those 
allegations. Richards Irrigation Company v. Karren, 880 P.2d 6, 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
Therefore, in these proceedings it is admitted that the individual who injured plaintiff Tracy 
Wagner was incapacitated and had no ability to formulate the intent required for an 
intentional tort,2 that this individual had a history of violent conduct, and that the defendants 
knew of the danger this individual presented to the public. Despite these admissions, the 
defendants made, and the trial court accepted, the inconsistent argument that 
notwithstanding the inability to form an intent, the conduct of the individual who injured 
2Plaintiffs' Complaint at paragraph 10 states, "The patient in question is an 
'incapacitated person' under any definition, including the definition found at Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-1-201(22). By reason of mental deficiency or developmental disability, the 
patient in question lacked sufficient understanding or capacity to be responsible, as a matter 
of law, for breaching any standard of care relating to any negligent or intentional tort." (R. 
4.) 
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plaintiff Tracy Wagner constituted the intentional torts of assault and battery as a matter of 
law. 
Defendants' immunity defense arises under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2), which 
relates to enumerated intentional torts, beginning with assault and battery. For this defense 
to apply and bar plaintiffs' claims, defendants must establish the intentional nature of the 
tort. "Immunity is an affirmative defense which the defendant bears the burden of proving.,f 
Trujillo v. Utah Department of Transportation, 986 P.2d 752, 760 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
In disregard of the State's burden to prove its defense, the trial court granted a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss without receiving any evidence to establish the defense. Intent is 
inherently a fact issue. Richards Irrigation Co., 880 P.2d at 10; see also Jarman v. Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising Co. 794 P.2d 492, 495 (Utah App. 1990). Where intent is a necessary 
element of a claim or a defense, it is error to dismiss the claim as a matter of law under Rule 
12(b)(6). Richards Irrigation Co. 880 P.2d at 10. 
The trial court stated the basis for his ruling as follows: "An intentional tort occurs 
when the actor commits a deliberate, as distinguished from an accidental act. Here there can 
be no claim that the actor did not act deliberately. Plaintiffs allege that he grabbed the victim 
by the hair and threw her to the ground-clearly a deliberate, not accidental act." (R. 71.) 
The trial court's "definition" of an intentional tort squarely conflicts with prior 
decisions of both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court. Matheson v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 
321 (Utah 1980), involved a claim by a junior high school janitor who was struck on the 
head by a tootsie pop thrown on a dare by a student on the second floor of an adjoining 
school building. The students admitted that they intended to hit the plaintiff with the tootsie 
pop, but claimed "they not intend to harm him in any way and merely undertook the 
7 
misadventure as an adolescent prank." 619 P.2d at 322. The holding of the Utah Supreme 
Court clearly states that more than just a "deliberate act" is required for an intentional tort: 
An individual may undertake an intentional act, such as 
throwing the tootsie pop in this particular case, and if the act is 
undertaken without an intent to harm or a substantial certainty 
that harm will result from the act, the actor is not guilty of an 
intentional tort. Instead, in such a situation, the activity is 
properly classified as reckless disregard of safety or reckless 
misconduct. 
619P.2dat322. 
A similar issue was addressed by the Utah Court of Appeals in Doe v. Doe, 878 P. 
2d 1161 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), which involved a claim that a ten-year-old boy had sexually 
assaulted a seven-year-old girl. The girl and her guardian brought a claim for negligence, 
and the boy defended on the ground that his actions were intentional, not negligent or 
reckless. The trial court granted the boy's motion for summary judgment, but this Court 
reversed. This Court, based on Matheson, held: 
In the present case, John Doe was a minor at the time he 
committed the sexual acts against Jane Doe. Plaintiffs' action 
was based upon a negligence claim of reckless disregard for the 
safety of Jane Doe. The trial court granted John Doe's motion 
for summary judgment based upon the fact that his acts were 
intentional. Consistent with Matheson, we hold that the trial 
court improperly granted John Doe's motion for summary 
judgment on plaintiffs' negligence claim and remand the case 
for resolution of the fact- sensitive issue of whether John Doe's 
acts constituted reckless misconduct. As stated in Matheson, 
reckless misconduct "results when a person, with no intent to 
cause harm, intentionally performs an act so unreasonable and 
dangerous that he knows or should know, it is highly probable 
that harm will result." Matheson, 619 P.2d at 322. 
878 P.2d at 1163. In a footnote, the court noted the boy's minority raised "certain 
presumptions" but held "the inquiry remains primarily factual in nature." 878 P.2d at 
1163 n. 2. 
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Other Utah decisions confirm that intent is an essential element of an assault or 
battery. In Tiede v. Utah State Department of Corrections, the Utah Supreme Court defined 
a tortious assault as an act "intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person 
of the other." 915 P.2d 500, 503 n.3 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added). This definition 
parallels the widely accepted conception of assault as an "intentional tort," wherein a 
showing regarding the culpable mental state of the attacker is a required element. See 74 
Am. Jur. 2d Torts § 16 (2001) (stating that "intentional torts, as distinguished from negligent 
or reckless torts, generally require that the actor intended the consequences of the act, not 
simply the act itself); see also Matheson v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 321, 321 (Utah 1980) 
(distinguishing intentional torts from negligent torts based on the grounds that "a negligent 
person has no desire to cause the harm that results from his carelessness. [Citation] And he 
must be distinguished from a person guilty of willful misconduct, such as assault and 
battery, who intends to cause harm"). 
The Restatement states that a party is liable for assault if "he acts intending to cause 
a harmful or offensive contact" Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21(l)(a) (1965). The 
Restatement further emphasizes the mental state required to establish the intentional tort of 
assault, stating that "an action which is not done with the intention stated in subsection (l)(a) 
does not make the actor liable to the other" for an assault. Id at §21(2). In the official 
comments to §21(2), the Restatement thus notes that "in order to become liable under the 
rule stated in this section, it is necessary that the actor intend to inflict a harmful or offensive 
bodily contact upon the other.... Unless he acts with such intent, the actor is not liable for 
assault." IdL at cmt. f; see also id. at §32(1) ("to make the actor liable for an assault, the actor 
must have intended to inflict a harmful or offensive contact upon the other or to have put the 
other in apprehension of such contact"). In Matheson, the Utah Supreme Court confirmed 
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that the intentional tort-based approach of the Restatement is the law in Utah, noting that 
ff[t]he gravamen of an assault and battery is the actor's intention to inflict injury/' 619 P.2d 
at 322. The State is required to show that the tort insulating it from liability was intentional. 
To do that it must show that Mr. Giese acted with malice or with knowledge that he was 
acting illegally. See Edwards v. Stills, 984 S.W.2d 366, 374 (Ark. 1998). The trial court did 
not hear evidence on whether the intent element was met or even on whether an intentional 
tort was committed and the dismissal of the case should be reversed on this ground. 
In light of these authorities, the holding of the trial court equating "intentional tort" 
with "deliberate act" was error. In both Matheson and Doe, the defendants admitted their 
acts were intentional but defended on the ground they had no intent to cause harm. The 
admission that the acts were deliberate was not sufficient. The additional element of an 
intent to cause harm must exist. 
In addition, the trial court's statement violates the rule that the complaint must be read 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. The trial court stated: "Here there can be no 
claim that the actor did not act deliberately. Plaintiffs allege that he grabbed the victim by 
the hair and threw her to the ground-clearly a deliberate, not accidental act." (R. 71.) 
"Deliberate" is defined as "Intentional; premeditated; fully considered." Black's Law 
Dictionary 438 (7th ed. 1999). Nothing in the complaint would compel a finding that the 
actions of Sam Giese were intentional, premeditated, or fully considered. 
The complaint alleged: "The patient became violent, took Tracy D. Wagner by the 
head and hair, and threw her to the ground and otherwise acted in such a way as to cause 
serious bodily injury to her." (R. 4 1f 8.) In light of the allegations that the defendant was 
mentally incapacitated, this allegation describes something more akin to a seizure or 
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involuntary action. There is certainly nothing in the allegations of the complaint that would 
compel a finding, as a matter of law, that Mr. Giese was capable of premeditating or fully 
considering an act and then implementing that act, and that he in fact did deliberately and 
after full consideration attack Tracy Wagner with the specific intent of harming her. 
The complaint does not allege an intentional tort. The trial court erred in equating 
deliberate act with intentional tort. The court further erred in holding that the acts of Sam 
Giese were deliberate because he did not have the mental capacity necessary to deliberate. 
The dismissal should be reversed and the case remanded for trial on the merits. 
POINT II: THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY IS IRRELEVANT. THE 
REAL ISSUE IS WHETHER MR. GIESE'S CONDUCT 
ACTUALLY CONSTITUTES AN INTENTIONAL TORT. 
Liability for committing a tort is a separate issue from whether the tort is intentional. 
This principle is articulated in Anicet v. Gant 580 So.2d 273, 275 (Dist. Ct. App.), rev 
denied. 591 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1991): 
Few areas of the law of torts are so interesting, and 
therefore have proved so challenging, as the responsibility of 
insane persons for acts which would clearly be tortious if 
committed by the competent. It has become well-settled law in 
Florida and elsewhere that, as a rule, a lunatic is liable in the 
same generalized way as is the ordinary person for both 
,fintentional" acts and "negligent" ones. The expression 
"generalized way" and the quotation marks which surround the 
words "intentional" and "negligent," have been employed 
advisedly. This is because, as the authorities uniformly 
recognize, it is impossible to ascribe either the volition implicit 
in an intentional tort, the departure from the standard of a 
"reasonable" person which defines an act of ordinary 
negligence, or indeed any concept of "fault" at all to one who, 
like Anicet, is by definition unable to control his own actions 
through an exercise of reason. 
Instead, the conclusion that liability exists is founded 
squarely and acknowledgedly upon principles of good public 
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policy which, it is held, are furthered by that conclusion. 
Almost invariably these considerations are stated to be: 
(1) the notion that as between an innocent injured person 
and an incompetent injuring one, the latter should bear the loss; 
and 
(2) the view that the imposition of liability would 
encourage the utmost restriction of the insane person so that he 
may cause no unnecessary damage to the innocent. 
Anicet at 275 (citations and footnote omitted). The court found that the facts of that case 
negated both principles of public policy because the injured party was an attendant who 
knew the violent tendencies of the incapacitated defendant and who was trying to control 
his conduct when injured. 
Under the public policy discussed in Anicet Mr. Giese could be liable regardless of 
whether the tortious conduct was intentional under the burden shifting process between two 
innocents; however, simply because Mr. Giese might be liable for the injuries he caused 
does not mean that he has committed an intentional tort. 
The concept of liability for assault or battery without proof of intent is not novel, but 
rather harks back to the historical common law trespass against the person. Trespass against 
the person did not require an intention to trespass. The court in Kaczer v. Marrero, 324 
So.2d. 717, 719 (Fla. Ct. App 1976), used this rationale to justify holding a mentally 
incompetent person liable for damages caused by acts which would be an assault and battery 
if committed by a competent person. 
Simply stated, an intentional tort requires an intent to inflict harm. Doe v. Doe, 878 
P.2d 1161,1163 n. 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). If Mr. Giese could not form the intent to inflict 
harm then he could not be guilty of an intentional tort even if he could still be liable for the 
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damages he caused. Thus, the liability of Mr. Giese is a red herring and the only issue is 
whether his conduct was motivated by the requisite intent to constitute an intentional tort. 
The recognition by the courts that intent to commit an assault or battery is not present 
in claims against a mentally incompetent defendant, is further supported by the rule that a 
mentally incompetent defendant is not liable for punitive damages due to an inability to form 
the requisite malicious intent. Goff v. Taylor, 708 S.W.2d 113, 115 (Ky. Ct. App.1986). 
The Utah courts have not had occasion to directly address a case of liability of a 
mentally impaired individual for assault and battery, but for purposes of this argument, 
plaintiffs assume that when the opportunity arises, the Utah courts will follow the majority 
rule that, "where one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss, it should be borne by the 
one who occasioned it." Goff at 115. If Utah were to adopt the majority rule and the public 
policy upon which it is premised, the public policy would be utterly frustrated by the 
misapplication of the rule by the trial court in this case. Tracy Wagner is truly innocent and 
had no warning or opportunity to avoid injury. Sam Giese is also innocent by reason of 
profound retardation, the apparent inability to control his violent tendencies, and his 
placement in the K-Mart store by his custodial caretakers. Thus, the plaintiff was injured 
through no fault of her own by another person who had no ability to control his behavior. 
Mr. Giese' s conduct may have been improper, but not intentionally so. It was the defendants 
who placed this individual in a public setting and created the dangerous situation which 
resulted in plaintiffs' injuries. The negligent conduct of the defendants is thus interposed 
between the innocent injured party and the innocent tortfeasor. If the intervening negligence 
of the defendants is not actionable, both of the principles of public policy referenced above 
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are negated because the plaintiffs are denied recovery and the incentive is weakened for the 
caretaker of such individuals to properly restrain them. 
It is a crude analogy, but the circumstances wherein the State of Utah put Mr. Giese 
unattended in a public setting is not unlike taking a lion into the K-Mart store. The potential 
for injury is well known, the lion has no ability to control its innate character, and the lion 
would not be there but for the caretakers. But for the State of Utah placing Mr. Giese in 
these circumstances, he would not have committed his acts of violence. The State totally 
controls his movements; he had no ability to transport himself and place himself in such 
circumstances, and it would be unjust to suggest that he should bear the fault of the State. 
Public policy is frustrated by immunizing the defendants from such neglect. 
Plaintiffs have discussed Mr. Giese's potential liability because the analysis of his 
liability was an integral part of the motion to dismiss and fundamental to the trial court's 
ruling below. In fact, Mr. Giese's liability is iiTelevant. Only his inability to commit an 
intentional tort is relevant to a determination of whether the plaintiffs' complaint can be 
dismissed on the pleadings. 
The only reason that the trial court dismissed this case is that Mr. Giese committed 
what that court believed was an intentional tort. It is unarguable that had Mr. Giese 
negligently caused the same injuries, in the same place, at the same time, upon the same 
plaintiff, under the same degree and character of supervision, the state would not be able to 
hide behind the immunity statute. 
In summary, the complaint properly raises the fact issue that Mr. Giese' s conduct was 
unintentional. It cannot be said as a matter of law that his conduct was intentional, and it 
was error to dismiss the case. 
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POINT III: THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY STATUTE REQUIRES THAT AN 
INTENTIONAL TORT BE PROVEN FOR IMMUNITY 
TO EXIST. 
The exception to the waiver of governmental immunity found at Utah Code Ann. § 
63-3-10(2) relieves the government of liability where the plaintiffs injury is the result of an 
assault or battery or other intentional tort. Section 63-30-10(2) is not ambiguous and should 
be interpreted according to its plain language to require proof of an intentional tort: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for 
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of employment except if 
the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from: 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, 
libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction 
of mental anguish, or violation of civil rights . . . . 
In Horton v. Royal Order of the Sun, the Utah Supreme Court held that "where the 
statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the language's plain 
meaning to divine legislative intent.1' 821 P.2d 1167, 1168 (Utah 1991). In Taylor v. Ogden 
City School District the Court noted that the rules of statutory interpretation require "fsjtrict 
application of the literal meaning" of the statutory terms. 927 P.2d 159, 163 (Utah 1996) 
(emphasis added). In interpreting statutory language, "we assume that each term was used 
advisedly; thus the words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused 
or inoperable." 927 P.2d at 162-163 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The 
court must "presume the legislature used each term advisedly and according to its ordinary 
meaning. Consequently, we avoid interpretations that will render portions of a statute 
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superfluous or inoperative." State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, fllO, 44 P.3d 680 (citation, 
brackets, and ellipses omitted). 
The terms "assault" and "battery" are terms of art that, when used in the context of 
a law or statute, unquestionably and quite plainly refer to either an intentional tort or a 
specific criminal act. As discussed below, Utah law unmistakably construes assault and 
battery as intentional torts that require a specific showing of intent. In order for the section 
63-30-10(2) exception for assault or battery to have any applicability to the present case, this 
Court would have to reinterpret those words so as to have them encompass an entirely new 
set of injury-producing physical contacts. 
The defendants invited the trial court to limit its analysis to the character of the 
physical acts involved, without regard to issues of intent, and the trial court effectively 
accepted that invitation. Limiting the analysis to the character of the physical actions 
involved in producing injury, without regard to intent, dramatically alters the scope of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. A real life example illustrates the point. At an indoor 
track in Utah County an individual collapsed and fell on another user of the track, effectively 
tackling the person and seriously injuring her. The physical contact between the two persons 
was the same as if the collapsing person had intentionally tackled the other causing great 
injury. If the trial court's focus on the physical action alone as determinative of the character 
of the tort is upheld, then it follows that the collapsing individual would be guilty of an 
intentional tort. If the government had responsibility for the collapsing person's actions, it 
would escape liability, even though it is clear no assault was intended. Section 63-30-
10(2)'s exception for "assault" and "battery" may not be read to include non-intentional acts, 
or a governmental employee who accidentally runs into a pedestrian due to inattention will 
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be just as guilty of assault as the governmental employee who becomes angry and 
intentionally runs down a pedestrian, and the policy to compensate citizens who are injured 
by negligent acts will be swallowed up in the immunity statute. 
The issue of intent is not irrelevant. The statute in question should not be allowed 
to become a catch-all provision for governmental immunity for all tortious acts, regardless 
of intent. Given that the introductory language to section 63-30-10 already expressly waives 
governmental immunity for an injury "proximately caused by a negligent act," the liberal 
construction of assault and battery would render the introductory language to section 63-30-
10 inoperative. The Supreme Court's holding in Tooele County makes it clear that such a 
reading is not allowed. 
According to the plain language of the statute, defendants cannot claim governmental 
immunity unless they can first show that the actions of Sam Giese constitute assault or 
battery. Defendants cannot do this. 
POINT IV: UTAH LAW DOES NOT PRECLUDE RECOVERY 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS FOR NEGLIGENCE IN 
FAILING TO CONTROL MR. GIESE; TO THE 
CONTRARY, BOTH THE HISTORY BEHIND THE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT AND THE 
ESTABLISHED PUBLIC POLICIES OF THIS STATE 
PERMIT RECOVERY BY PLAINTIFFS. 
The trial court relied principally on the decision in Wright v. University of Utah, 876 
P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In Wright the plaintiff alleged that the injuries resulted 
from an assault, but attempted to avoid the effect of Utah Code Ann. § 63-3-10(2) by 
alleging a negligent supervision claim. The fact that the plaintiff admitted and alleged that 
the injuries arose out of an assault make Wright fundamentally different and inapposite to 
the present case. 
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For example, if a party were to be assaulted by a bear which was kept by a zoo owned 
and operated by a governmental entity, it would be absurd to suggest that the bear had 
committed an intentional tort and that governmental immunity barred the claim. Plaintiffs 
hasten to add that in suggesting this example, they do not make any unfavorable 
comparisons between an animal and Mr. Giese, who is entitled to human dignity and respect; 
however, Mr. Giese was no more able to formulate the intent to commit an assault than the 
bear in this example. In such circumstances, the pleading of a cause of action for negligent 
supervision is the sum and substance of the matter, not an attempt to skirt around and avoid 
the consequences of an admitted assault. Wright's holding is not related to the issue 
presented by this appeal of whether a mentally incompetent person can commit an 
intentional tort. 
The issue of mental competency and intentional torts was raised in Wright; however, 
the Court expressly stated that its holding did not control on that question, noting in passim 
that the Wright plaintiffs had not properly raised the issue of mental incapability in their 
pleadings. See id. at 384. The court thus noted that Wright "did not allege that the employee 
unintentionally struck her-she stated that the employee 'assaulted and struck her.' By our 
reading, and the trial court's, 'assaulted and struck' expresses an intentional hitting." Ici 
By contrast, plaintiffs herein properly raised the issue of mental incapacity in their pleadings. 
The trial court's reliance on Wright as controlling authority is misplaced, and the 
discussion therein of the potential legality of an intentional tort claim against a mentally 
incompetent person is dictum. In dictum, the divided majority in Wright conjectured, in the 
abstract, regarding the issue of whether governmental immunity would be waived if the 
attacker did not possess the requisite mental state for an assault. Id at 386. In dictum, the 
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two judges comprising the Wright majority concluded that any attempts to establish a waiver 
of governmental immunity through a showing of mental incapability would be "fruitless, 
albeit creative, attempt to circumvent the clear language of section 63-30-10." Id. at 386. 
The court concluded: "Nothing in the Act or in our case law indicates that the distinction 
Wright champions was contemplated by the legislature to determine whether immunity 
exists under section 63-30-10(2)." Wright, 876 P.2d at 386. The clear language of the Act 
and the legislative history of the Act, as discussed in Point III above and Point IV below, 
prove that the Wright majority's conclusion-in-dictum was made in error. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should adopt the plain language of the statute and rule that plaintiffs' suit 
is not precluded by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. This result would be clearly 
consistent with the demands of the statute, with the wishes of the Legislature, and ultimately 
with the demands of equitable justice. 
DATED this _L_ day of June, 2003. 
D. DAVID LAMBERT and 
LESLIE W. SLAUQH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWV& PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
/ STATE OF UTAH 
TT 
TRACY D. WAGNER and ROBERT W. 
WAGNER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH 
'DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES, and^JTAH STATE 
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
Case No. 0 0 0 4 0 ^ = 5 
Judge 
Division No. 1 
Plaintiffs, for cause of action against the defendants, alleges: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiffs are individuals who reside in Utah County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendants are governmental entities. 
3. Plaintiffs have complied with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act by serving 
defendants with a notice of claim. Defendants have failed to admit or deny the claim and more 
than ninety days have passed since the giving of the required notice. 
4. Plaintiffs have posted herewith an undertaking as required by U.C.A. § 63-30-
19, 1953, as amended. 
f 
5. Plaintiffs claims are for personal injuries which occurred in Utah County State 
of Utah. 
6. The court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties. 
7. Venue is properly place before this court. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
8. Plaintiff Tracy D. Wagner was doing business at the K-Mart store located at 
175 North West State Road in American Fork, Utah on October 16, 2001, at approximately 
12:30 p.m., and was standing in line with others at the customer service desk near the front of 
the store. Unknown to Tracy D. Wagner, a patient of the Utah State Development Center was 
in the store somewhere behind her. The patient became violent, took Tracy D. Wagner by the 
head and hair, and threw her to the ground and otherwise acted in such a way as to cause serious 
bodily injury to her. 
9. The patient in question was under the care, custody and control of the Utah 
State Development Center for a sufficient time that the agents and employees of the Center knew 
or should have known he had a history of violent conduct. 
10. The patient in question is an "incapacitated person" under any definition, 
including the definition found at Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(22). By reason of mental 
deficiency or developmental disability, the patient in question lacked sufficient understanding or 
capacity to be responsible, as a matter of law, for breaching any standard of care relating to any 
negligent or intentional tort. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
11. The Utah State Development Center owed plaintiffs a duty of care to properly 
supervise the activity of the patient in question. 
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12. The agents and employees of the Center knew or should have known that the 
patient presented a danger to the public and that he either should not be taken to public places 
or he should be closely attended and controlled so as to protect the public from his violent 
character. 
13. The Utah State Development Center employees who had charge of the patient 
in question negligently took the patient to a public place and/or failed to adequately supervise 
the activity of the patient in question. 
14. The negligence and failures of the Utah State Development Center and its 
agents and employees proximately caused injuries to Tracy D. Wagner and damages to both 
Tracy D. Wagner and Robert Wagner. 
15. The Utah State Development Center is responsible for the conduct of the patient 
in question and for the conduct of its employees and agents who took the patient to the K-Mart 
store. 
16. The Utah State Development Center is an agency of the Utah Department of 
Human Services which is a division of the State of Utah. The State of Utah is liable for the 
actions of its divisions and agencies, and the Division of Human Services is liable for the actions 
of its agencies. 
17. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 waives governmental immunity for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope 
of employment. 
18. Claimants have sustained special damages by reason of the negligence of the 
State of Utah, Department of Human Services, Utah State Development Center. Those special 
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damages include healthcare treatment expenses which include, but are not limited to, emergency 
care, chiropractic treatment, counseling, and plastic surgery care. 
19. Claimants have lost income and continue to lose income. Claimants have also 
suffered a loss of earning capacity. Claimants have not yet calculated the income losses, which 
are ongoing. 
20. Plaintiffs have sustained general damages as a direct and proximate result of 
the conduct of the defendants. The general damages include, but are not limited to, impairment 
to function, emotional distress and suffering, pain, and loss of activities. 
21. Plaintiff Robert Wagner has suffered a loss of consortium as defined under Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-2-11 in that his wife, Tracy D. Wagner, has suffered significant permanent 
injuries that have substantially changed the lifestyle of the claimants, including significant 
disfigurement and incapability of performing the types of jobs she performed before the injury. 
Wherefore, plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendants as follows: 
1. For special damages in such amounts as may be established upon proof. 
2. For general damages in such amounts as may be established upon proof. 
3. For interest on all damages as may be provided by law. 
4. For costs of court. 
5. For such other and further relief as to the court seems just and equitable. 
si 
DATED this ?& day of July, 2002. 
YlA,rf\ 
D ^ A V I D LAMBERT, land i 
DOUGLASS. F|NCH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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Plaintiffs' address: 
1175 East 800 North 
Lehi, Utah 84043 
APPENDIX "B" 
RULING (R. 72-70) 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY D. WAGNER, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, et al, 
Defendants. 
CASE NUMBER: 020403185 
DATED: DECEMBER 20, 2002 
RULING 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
This case is before the court on defendants5 motion to dismiss on the basis of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. I grant the motion. 
Though the result may appear harsh, this action is barred by the Immunity Act and 
must be dismissed. In what clearly is an effort to plead around the Immunity Act, 
plaintiffs allege that the patient in question "became violent, took Tracy D. Wagner by the 
head and hair, and threw her to the ground and otherwise acted in such a way as to cause 
serious bodily injury to her." In almost any other context this would be labeled an assault. 
But, given the holding of Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d, 380, 383-83 (Utah App. 
1994), had plaintiffs so labeled the act as an assault, Wright would apply and the 
Immunity Act would bar the action. Instead, plaintiffs describe the acts without applying 
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a label While creative, as noted in Wright, the effort is fruitless. An intentional tort 
occurs when the actor commits a deliberate, as distinguished from an accidental act. Here 
there can be no claim that the actor did not act deliberately. Plaintiffs allege that he 
grabbed the victim by the hair and threw her to the ground-clearly a deliberate, not 
accidental act. 
In addition, it is not clear this result will leave plaintiffs without a remedy as there 
is case law that provides that a mentally infirm person may be held liable for their 
assaults. 
I grant the motion to dismiss, finding that this action is barred by the 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Defendant's 
counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated this 2 2 daY of December, 2002. 
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APPENDIX "C" 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
AND DISMISSING ALL CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE (R. 75-73) 
BARRY G. LAWRENCE - 5304 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF - 4666 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY WAGNER and ROBERT W. 
WAGNER, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF HUMAN SERVICES, and UTAH 
STATE DEVELOPMENT CENTER, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
DISMISSING ALL CLAIMS WITH 
PREJUDICE 
Civil No. 020403185 
Judge: Anthony Schofield 
This Court, in an Ruling dated December 20, 2002, (a copy of which is attached and 
incorporated herein by this reference), granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Specifically, 
this Court ruled that based on the four corners of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this case arises out of an 
assault-i.e., a deliberate, rather than accidental, attack upon the plaintiff. Thus, plaintiffs claims 
are barred by Utah's Governmental Immunity Act, specifically Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2). 
ORIGINAL 
FILED 
Fo:jr-<- ,• <,,->•*.: s t r i c t Court 
c* >J\5/- . r i v \» , f-Anie of Utah 
\VOnl !>*DUtV 
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed September 13, 2002, is granted. 
2. All of plaintiffs' claims against all defendants are hereby dismissed, on their merits 
and with prejudice. 
3. Because this Order resolves all claims pending between the plaintiff and all of the 
defendants, this Order shall constitute a Final Order and/or Judgment of this matter. 
DATED this IQ_ day of January, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: -
/i " 
JUDGE ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD 
Fourth District'Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Xjy day of December, 2002, pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah R. 
Jud. Admin., I caused to be served by fax transmission, a true and correct copy of foregoing 
(Proposed) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
DISMISSING ALL CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE to the following: 
D. David Lambert 
Douglas W. Finch 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON, P.C. 
120 East 300 North St. 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo,UT 84603 
Fax: 801-377-4991 
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APPENDIX *'D" 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act 
or omission of employee —Exceptions. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, 
intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract 
rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil rights; 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or 
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, 
order, or similar authorization; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent 
inspection; 
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, 
even if malicious or without probable cause; 
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or 
intentional; 
(7) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and civil 
disturbances; 
(8) the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city jail, or 
other place of legal confinement; 
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any 
condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or mining operation, or any 
activity authorized by the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the 
Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for the 
clearing of fog; 
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters; 
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems; 
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in accordance 
with the requirements of Section 41-6-14; 
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway, road, 
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure 
located on them; 
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public building, 
structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement; 
(18) the activities of: 
(a) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(b) fighting fire; 
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or 
hazardous wastes; 
(d) emergency evacuations; 
(e) transporting or removing injured persons to a place where 
emergency medical assistance can be rendered or where the person can 
be transported by a licensed ambulance service; or 
(f) intervening during dam emergencies; or 
(19) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform any 
function pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 5a, Dam Safety, or Title 73, Chapter 10, Board 
of Water Resources —Division of Water Resources, which immunity is in addition 
to all other immunities granted by law. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, §§ 10; 1975, ch. 194, §§ 11; 1982, ch. 10, §§ 1; 
1985, ch. 169, §§ 1; 1989, ch. 185, §§ 1; 1989, ch. 187, §§ 3; 1989, ch. 268, §§ 29; 
1990, ch. 15, §§§§ 1, 2; 1990, ch. 319, §§§§ 1, 2; 1991, ch. 76, §§ 4; 1995, ch. 299, 
§§ 35; 1996, ch. 159, §§ 6; 1996, ch. 264, §§ 1; 2001, ch. 185, §§ 1. 
